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Abstract
This paper examines the effect of uncertainty on investment timing in a canonical real options
model. We show that the critical value of a project that triggers the exercise of the investment
option exhibits a U-shaped pattern against the volatility of the project. This is due to the two
countervailing risk and return factors in effect. We further show that such a U-shaped pattern is
inherited by the expected time to exercise the investment option. Thus, for relatively safe projects,
greater uncertainty shortens the expected exercise time and thus enhances investment. This is in
sharp contrast to the negative investment-uncertainty relationship commonly found in the extant
literature. Finally, we show that the positive investment-uncertainty relationship is more likely for
high growth projects than for low growth projects.
JEL classification: D21; D81; G13
Keywords: Real options; Investment timing; Uncertainty
1. Introduction
Economists have long been fascinated by the investment-uncertainty relationship. The
extant literature by and large dictates a negative sign to such a relationship (see Caballero,
1991; Leahy and Whited, 1996). Using a canonical real options model of McDonald and
Siegel (1986) and Dixit and Pindyck (1994), Sarkar (2000) shows that the investment-
uncertainty relationship is not necessarily monotonic. Viewing investment opportunities
∗Tel.: +852-2859-1044; fax: +852-2548-1152.
E-mail address: kpwong@econ.hku.hk (K.P. Wong).
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as perpetual American call options, firms endogenously devise their investment timing so
as to maximize the option values. The optimal decision rule is that a project should be
undertaken at the moment when the value of the project reaches a critical level (the optimal
investment trigger). To gauge the effect of uncertainty on investment, Sarkar (2000) uses
the probability of reaching the optimal investment trigger within a prespecified period of
time. If this probability measure increases (decreases) with the volatility of the project, one
can reasonably infer a positive (negative) sign of the uncertainty-investment relationship.
This paper follows the real options approach of Sarkar (2000), albeit with a caveat.
In order to draw implications regarding the investment-uncertainty relationship, we use
the effect of uncertainty on investment timing rather than on the probability measure as
suggested by Sarkar (2000). Investment timing is defined by the expected time to reach
the optimal investment trigger (see also Shackleton and Wojakowski, 2002; Grenadier and
Wang, 2005). Given that the value of the project evolves over time according to a geometric
Brownian motion, the expected exercise time takes on a much simpler functional form
than the probability measure used by Sarkar (2000) (see Karlin and Taylor, 1975). This
offers great advantage to us that clean analytical results can be easily derived and clearly
explained.
As in Sarkar (2000), we employ the single-factor intertemporal capital asset pricing
model (CAPM) of Merton (1973a) to determine the risk-adjusted rate of return on the
project. In the real options literature, it is generally believed that the optimal investment
trigger is an increasing function of the underlying volatility of the project.1 Dixit and
Pindyck (1994) verify such a comparative statics result by implicitly assuming that the risk-
adjusted rate of return on the project is invariant to the volatility, which contradicts the
CAPM in that a linearly positive relationship between risk and return exists in equilibrium.
We show that the behavior of the optimal investment trigger with respect to the volatility of
the project is non-monotonic. There are two countervailing factors, the risk factor and the
return factor, in effect. When the volatility of the project goes up, the risk factor enhances
1For example, Sarkar (2000) states that “it is obvious that a higher level of uncertainty will increase the
critical trigger level ..., and thereby have a negative effect on investment (p. 222).”
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the value of the option to invest in the project and thus makes waiting more beneficial.
This lifts up the exercise trigger. On the other hand, the return factor arising from the
upward adjustment of the discount rate makes waiting more costly. This pushes down the
exercise trigger. The return factor dominates for low levels of uncertainty, while the risk
factor dominates for high levels of uncertainty, thereby rendering a U-shaped pattern of the
optimal investment trigger against the volatility of the project.
We further show that the expected exercise time inherits the U-shaped pattern of the
optimal investment trigger against the volatility of the project. Specifically, the return
factor that calls for shortening the exercise time dominates for relatively safe projects,
while the risk factor that calls for lengthening the exercise time dominates for sufficiently
risky projects. Thus, it is quite possible that greater uncertainty may in fact lure firms into
making more investment through shortening the expected exercise time, especially when
projects are relatively safe. This is in sharp contrast to the negative investment-uncertainty
relationship commonly found in the extant literature. Finally, we show that the positive
investment-uncertainty relationship is more likely to prevail for high growth projects than
for low growth projects.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. The next section delineates the model and
characterizes the optimal investment trigger. Sections 3 and 4 examine how the optimal
investment trigger and the investment timing respond to increased volatility of the project,
respectively. Section 5 offers a numerical example to gain additional insight. The final
section concludes.
2. The model
Consider a canonical real options model a` la McDonald and Siegel (1986) and Dixit and
Pindyck (1994). In this model, a firm has an option to invest in a project whose value,
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V (t), evolves over time according to the following geometric Brownian motion:
dV (t) = αV (t)dt+ σV (t)dW (t), (1)
where W (t) is a standard Wiener process, and α and σ are the drift rate (expected growth
rate) and volatility (standard derivation) per unit of time, respectively, with α > σ2/2.2
The firm can undertake the project at any time by paying a deterministic investment cost,
I , at that moment. The initial value of the project is denoted by V0 = V (0).
As in Sarkar (2000), we assume that the risk-adjusted rate of return on the project
is determined by the single-factor intertemporal capital asset pricing model (CAPM) of
Merton (1973a). The per-unit value of the market portfolio, Pm(t), is governed by the
following geometric Brownian motion:
dPm(t) = µmPm(t)dt+ σmPm(t)dZm(t), (2)
where Zm(t) is a standard Wiener process correlated with W (t), and µm and σm are the
drift rate and volatility per unit of time, respectively. Denote r as the riskless rate of interest
and λ = (µm − r)/σm as the market price of risk.
Alternatively, we can write Eq. (1) as
dV (t) = αV (t)dt+ ρσV (t)dZm(t) +
√
1− ρ2σV (t)dZ(t), (3)
where Z(t) is a standard Wiener process independent of Zm(t), and ρ ∈ [−1, 1] is the cor-
relation coefficient between the value of the project and the return on the market portfolio.
Inspection of Eq. (3) reveals that ρ2σ2 and (1− ρ2)σ2 capture the systematic risk and the
idiosyncratic risk of the project, respectively.
According to the CAPM, the risk-adjusted rate of return that investors would require
if they are to own the project is given by r + λρσ. Let F (V0) be the value of the option to
2Using Ito’s Lemma, Eq. (1) implies that lnV (t) follows a Brownian motion with drift α − σ2/2 and
volatility σ. The assumption that α > σ2/2 ensures that the drift rate is positive. As is evident from Eq.
(22), this assumption is necessary for a meaningful expected time to exercise the investment option. If we
follow Sarkar (2000) to use the probability of investment rather than the expected time to investment, we
no longer require such an assumption.
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invest in the project (hereafter referred to as the investment option), evaluated at time 0.
Since the payoff from undertaking the project at time t is given by V (t)− I , we have
F (V0) = max
t∗
E{[V (t∗)− I ]e−(r+λρσ)t∗}, (4)
subject to Eq. (1). To find the optimal time, t∗, at which the investment option is exercised
is tantamount to solving the critical value of the project, V ∗, that triggers the exercise of
the investment option. To ensure that V ∗ is finite, we assume that α < r + λρσ.3
Using the standard argument (see Appendix A), the value of the investment option at
time t, F [V (t)], satisfies the following differential equation:
1
2
σ2V (t)2F ′′[V (t)] + (α− λρσ)V (t)F ′[V (t)]− rF [V (t)] = 0, (5)
subject to the following boundary conditions:
F (0) = 0, (6)
F (V ∗) = V ∗ − I, (7)
F ′(V ∗) = 1. (8)
Eq. (6) reflects the fact that zero is an absorbing barrier for the geometric Brownian motion
in Eq. (1). Eq. (7) is the value-matching condition such that at the moment the investment
option is exercised, its payoff is equal to the net present value of the project. Eq. (8) is the
smooth-pasting condition such that the optimal investment trigger is the one that maximizes
the value of the investment option (Dumas, 1991; Dixit, 1993).4
Eq. (5) is a second-order linear homogeneous differential equation. The general solution
takes the form of a power function, AV β , where A is a constant to be determined and β is
a solution to the following quadratic equation:
1
2
σ2β(β − 1) + (α− λρσ)β− r = 0. (9)
3For this convergence issue, see McDonald and Siegel (1986) and Dixit and Pindyck (1994). See also Eq.
(11).
4Shackleton and Sødal (2005) show that smooth pasting implies rate of return equalization between the
option and the levered position that results from exercise.
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There are two roots for Eq. (9), one positive and the other negative. For Eq. (6) to hold,
the coefficient for the negative β must be zero and therefore we have
β =
1
2
− α− λρσ
σ2
+
√(
1
2
− α− λρσ
σ2
)2
+
2r
σ2
. (10)
Given that α < r + λρσ, it is evident from Eq. (10) that β > 1.
Using F (V ) = AV β to solve Eqs. (7) and (8), we derive the optimal investment trigger
as
V ∗ =
β
β − 1I, (11)
and the value of the investment option at time 0 as
F (V0) =

(V ∗ − I)(V0/V ∗)β if V0 < V ∗,
V0 − I if V0 ≥ V ∗,
(12)
where (V0/V ∗)β is the stochastic discount factor that accounts for both the timing and the
probability of one dollar received at the first moment when the optimal investment trigger,
V ∗, is reached. To ensure some positive option value inherent in the project, in the sequel
we assume that V0 < V ∗.
3. The trigger-uncertainty relationship
In this section, we study the effect of uncertainty on the optimal investment trigger, V ∗.
Sarkar (2000) refers to increased uncertainty as an increase in σ, taking all other parameters,
r, λ, ρ, and α, as constants. In this case, the increase in σ has a systematic risk component
and thus affects the dividend stream, r+λρσ−α, in accord with the CAPM. On the other
hand, McDonald and Siegel (1986) and Dixit and Pindyck (1994) consider another type
of increased uncertainty in which the dividend stream is held fixed when σ changes. In
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this case, the increase in σ has only an idiosyncratic risk component.5 While we follow the
approach of Sarkar (2000), we can also get the scenario of McDonald and Siegel (1986) and
Dixit and Pindyck (1994) by setting ρ = 0.
Differentiating Eq. (9) with respect to σ yields
∂β
∂σ
=
β[λρ− σ(β − 1)]
σ2(β − 1/2) + α− λρσ. (13)
Differentiating Eq. (11) with respect to σ yields
∂V ∗
∂σ
= − I
(β − 1)2
∂β
∂σ
=
V ∗[σ(β − 1)− λρ]
(β − 1)[σ2(β − 1/2) + α− λρσ], (14)
where the second equality follows from Eq. (13). If ρ ≤ 0, it is evident from Eq. (14) that
∂V ∗/∂σ > 0 for all σ ∈ (0,√2α). However, if ρ > 0, the trigger-uncertainty relationship is
no longer monotonic, as is shown in the following proposition.
Proposition 1. If ρ ≤ 0, ∂V ∗/∂σ > 0 for all σ ∈ (0,√2α). If ρ > 0, there exists a unique
point, σ∗ ∈ (0,√2α), defined by
σ∗ =
√(
2r− 2α+ λ2ρ2
2λρ
)2
+ 2α − 2r − 2α+ λ
2ρ2
2λρ
, (15)
such that ∂V ∗/∂σ < 0 for all σ ∈ (0, σ∗) and ∂V ∗/∂σ > 0 for all σ ∈ (σ∗,√2α).
Proof. See Appendix B.
In the real options literature, it is generally believed that the optimal investment trigger,
V ∗, is strictly increasing in the underlying volatility, σ. Dixit and Pindyck (1994, p. 144)
verify such a comparative statics result by implicitly assuming that the risk-adjusted rate of
return on the project is invariant to σ. Of course, this assumption is innocuous if the increase
in σ is solely idiosyncratic in nature, which is qualitatively identical to our case when ρ = 0.
5See also Cappuccio and Moretto (2001) and Lund (2005) for the distinction between these two types of
increased uncertainty.
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According to the CAPM, the risk-adjusted rate of return on the project is linearly related
to σ in general, and such a relationship is positive when ρ > 0 in particular. It is this
positive relationship between risk and return, which has not been properly accounted for
in the real options literature, that drives the U-shaped pattern of the optimal investment
trigger against the volatility in the case that ρ > 0.
To see the intuition, let us consider the hypothetical case without any uncertainty. When
σ = 0, we have V (t) = V0eαt. Program (4) becomes
F (V0) = max
t∗
[V0eαt
∗ − I ]e−µt∗ , (16)
where µ is the discount rate and µ > α to ensure convergence. As shown in Dixit and
Pindyck (1994, p. 138), the exercise trigger that solves program (16) is given by
V ∗ =
µ
µ− αI, (17)
if V ∗ > V0. Differentiating Eq. (17) with respect to µ yields
∂V ∗
∂µ
= − α
(µ − α)2 I < 0. (18)
In words, an increase in the discount rate makes waiting more costly and thus induces the
firm to lower the optimal investment trigger in the deterministic case.
In the case of uncertainty, two factors are in effect when the volatility of the project
goes up. To see this, we rewrite Eq. (14) as
∂V ∗
∂σ
=
V ∗σ
σ2(β − 1/2) + α − λρσ −
V ∗λρ
(β − 1)[σ2(β − 1/2) + α− λρσ] . (19)
The first term on the right-hand side of Eq. (19) captures the risk factor that holds the risk-
adjusted rate of return on the project constant at r+λρσ. The risk factor is unambiguously
positive because an increase in σ enhances the value of the investment option (Merton,
1973b) and thus induces the firm to wait longer by lifting up the exercise trigger. The
second term on the right-hand side of Eq. (19) captures the return factor that holds the
value of the investment option constant at σ. The return factor is positive or negative,
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depending on whether ρ is negative or positive, respectively. According to the CAPM, an
increase in σ renders the discount rate to be adjusted upward (downward) if ρ > (<) 0. As
shown in Eq. (18), waiting becomes more (less) costly and thus the firm is induced to lower
(raise) the exercise trigger.
If ρ < 0, the risk and return factors reinforce each other. The trigger-uncertainty
relationship is positive in line with the conventional wisdom in the extant literature. On
the other hand, if ρ > 0, the two factors act against each other. When there is relatively
little uncertainty, it is evident from Eq. (19) that the risk factor has at best second-order
significance while the return factor always has first-order effect because the risk-adjusted
rate of return on the project is linear in σ in accord with the CAPM. Thus, for all σ < (>) σ∗,
the return factor dominates (is dominated by) the risk factor, thereby making the optimal
investment trigger exhibit a U-shaped pattern against the volatility of the project.
4. The investment-uncertainty relationship
In this section, we study the effect of uncertainty on the expected time to invest. Let
T be the first passage time that the value of the project reaches the optimal investment
trigger, V ∗, from the initial value, V0. Using Ito’s Lemma, Eq. (1) implies that lnV (t)
follows a Brownian motion with drift α− σ2/2 and volatility σ. Applying Theorem 5.3 in
Karlin and Taylor (1975, p. 363), the probability density function of T is given by
φ(T ) =
ln(V ∗/V0)
σ
√
2piT 3
e−
[ln(V ∗/V0)−(α−σ2/2)T ]2
2σ2T , (20)
and the Laplace transform of T is given by
E(e−θT ) =
∫ ∞
0
e−θTφ(T )dT = e−[
√
(α−σ2/2)2+2σ2θ−(α−σ2/2)]ln(V ∗/V0)/σ2 , (21)
where E(·) is the expectation operator with respect to φ(T ) defined in Eq. (20).
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Based on Eq. (21), we can derive the expected time to exercise the investment option
as (see also Shackleton and Wojakowski, 2002; Grenadier and Wang, 2005)
E(T ) =
∫ ∞
0
Tφ(T )dT = − lim
θ→0
∂E(e−θT )
∂θ
=
ln(V ∗/V0)
α − σ2/2 . (22)
Differentiating Eq. (22) with respect to σ yields
∂E(T )
∂σ
=
1
(α− σ2/2)2
[
σln
(
V ∗
V0
)
+
(
α− σ
2
2
)
1
V ∗
∂V ∗
∂σ
]
. (23)
If ρ ≤ 0, it is evident from Proposition 1 and Eq. (23) that ∂E(T )/∂σ > 0 for all σ ∈
(0,
√
2α). However, if ρ > 0, Proposition 1 says that the trigger-uncertainty relationship is
U-shaped. As is shown in the following proposition, the investment-uncertainty relationship
is also U-shaped in the case that ρ > 0.
Proposition 2. If ρ ≤ 0, we have ∂E(T )/∂σ > 0 for all σ > 0. If ρ > 0, there exists a
unique point, σo ∈ (0, σ∗), implicitly defined by
∂E(T )
∂σ
∣∣∣∣
σ=σo
= 0, (24)
such that ∂E(T )/∂σ < 0 for all σ ∈ (0, σo) and ∂E(T )/∂σ > 0 for all σ ∈ (σo,√2α).
Proof. See Appendix C.
To see the intuition of Proposition 2, we use Eq. (19) to recast Eq. (23) as
∂E(T )
∂σ
= σ
{
ln(V ∗/V0)
(α− σ2/2)2 +
1
(α− σ2/2)[σ2(β − 1/2) + α− λρσ]
}
− λρ
(α− σ2/2)(β − 1)[σ2(β − 1/2) + α − λρσ]. (25)
Inspection of Eq. (25) reveals two factors that govern the expected time to invest when
the volatility of the project goes up. As in the previous section, the first term on the
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right-hand side of Eq. (25) captures the risk factor while the second term captures the
return factor. If ρ < 0, the two factors reinforce each other so that the firm cuts down its
investment by stretching the expected exercise time in response to increased uncertainty. In
the more plausible case that ρ > 0, Proposition 2 states that greater uncertainty may in fact
lure the firm into making more investment through shortening the expected exercise time,
especially when the project is relatively safe (i.e., σ < σo). When the project is sufficiently
risky (i.e., σ > σo), the usual negative investment-uncertainty relationship as suggested
in the extant literature prevails. This non-monotonic investment-uncertainty relationship
is driven by the U-shaped pattern of the optimal investment trigger against the volatility
of the project. Specifically, the return factor that calls for shortening the exercise time
dominates for relatively safe projects, while the risk factor that calls for lengthening the
exercise time dominates for sufficiently risky projects.
Finally, it is of interest to examine whether the positive investment-uncertainty rela-
tionship is more likely to be observed among high growth projects or among low growth
projects. To this end, we conduct a comparative statics exercise of σo with respect to α in
the following proposition.
Proposition 3. Consider the case that ρ > 0. If the following condition holds:
ln
(
r
r − α
)
+ ln
(
I
V0
)
≥ α
r − α, (26)
then dσo/dα > 0.
Proof. See Appendix D.
The intuition of Proposition 3 is as follows. In the deterministic case, we can use Eq.
(18) to derive
∂2V ∗
∂µ∂α
= − µ + α
(µ − α)3 I < 0. (27)
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In words, Eq. (27) implies that, as the growth rate of the project increases, the firm under
certainty is induced to lower the optimal investment trigger further in response to an increase
in the discount rate. The return factor is thus stronger for high growth projects than for
low growth projects, ceteris paribus. The effect of a higher growth rate of the project on the
risk factor, however, is indeterminate. Condition (26) offers a sufficient (but not necessary)
condition for the positive effect on the return factor to dominate so that dσo/dα > 0.
Condition (26) holds when the initial net present value of the project, V0− I , is sufficiently
negative, or when the wedge between the riskless rate of interest and the growth rate of
the project, r − α, is sufficiently large. In this case, the positive investment-uncertainty
relationship is more likely for high growth projects than for low growth projects.
5. Numerical analysis
To gain more insight, we construct a numerical example in this section. As in Sarkar
(2000), we use the following parameter values: r = 0.1, λ = 0.4, ρ = 0.7, V0 = 0.1, and
I = 1. We employ Eq. (22) to compute the expected exercise time, E(T ), for different
values of σ ∈ (0,√2α) and α ∈ {0.03, 0.05, 0.07}.6 Fig. 1 depicts the behavior of E(T ) with
respect to σ for the three different values of α.
6The choice of the parameter values of r, α, V0, and I satisfies condition (26).
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Fig. 1. The relationship between the expected exercise time, E(T ), and the volatility of the
project, σ, when r = 0.1, λ = 0.4, ρ = 0.7, V0 = 0.1, and I = 1.
As is evident from Fig. 1, the expected exercise time first decreases and then increases
with σ. The turning points are at σ = 0.08 when α = 0.07, σ = 0.051 when α = 0.05, and
σ = 0.027 when α = 0.03. For σ sufficiently low, an increase in σ shortens the expected time
to exercise the investment option and thereby has a positive effect on the level of investment.
The numerical example also shows that such a positive investment-uncertainty relationship
is more likely to be observed for high growth projects than for low growth projects.
6. Conclusions
This paper has examined the effect of uncertainty on investment timing in a canonical
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real options model of McDonald and Siegel (1986) and Dixit and Pindyck (1994). Specif-
ically, we have shown that the critical value of a project (the optimal investment trigger)
that triggers the exercise of the investment option exhibits a U-shaped pattern against the
volatility of the project. This U-shaped pattern is due to two countervailing factors in ef-
fect. When the volatility of the project goes up, the risk factor enhances the value of the
investment option and thus makes waiting more beneficial. This lifts up the exercise trigger.
On the other hand, the return factor arising from the upward adjustment of the discount
rate makes waiting more costly. This pushes down the exercise trigger. The return factor
dominates for low levels of uncertainty, while the risk factor dominates for high levels of
uncertainty. We have further shown that the U-shaped pattern of the optimal investment
trigger against the volatility is inherited by the expected time to exercise the investment op-
tion. Thus, for relatively safe projects, greater uncertainty may in fact shorten the expected
exercise time and thereby lure firms into making more investment. This is in sharp con-
trast to the usual negative investment-uncertainty relationship as suggested in the extant
literature. Finally, we have shown that the positive investment-uncertainty relationship is
more likely for high growth projects than for low growth projects.
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Appendix A. Derivation of Eq. (5)
Consider the following dynamic portfolio at time t: (i) Hold the investment option that
is worth F [V (t)], and (ii) go short n units of the market portfolio. The value of this portfolio
is F [V (t)]− nPm(t). The total return from holding the portfolio over a short time interval,
dt, is
dF [V (t)]− ndPm(t)
= F ′[V (t)]dV (t) +
1
2
F ′′[V (t)][dV (t)]2 − nµmPm(t)dt − nσmPm(t)dZm(t)
=
{
αV (t)F ′[V (t)] +
1
2
σ2V (t)2F ′′[V (t)]− nµmPm(t)
}
dt
+{ρσV (t)F ′[V (t)]− nσmPm(t)}dZm(t) +
√
1− ρ2σV (t)F ′[V (t)]dZ(t), (A.1)
where the first equality follows from Ito’s Lemma, and the second equality follows from Eq.
(3) and [dV (t)]2 = σ2V (t)2dt. Substituting n = ρσV (t)F ′[V (t)]/σmPm(t) into Eq. (A.1)
yields
dF [V (t)]− ρσV (t)F
′[V (t)]
σmPm(t)
dPm(t)
=
{[
α− µmρσ
σm
]
V (t)F ′[V (t)] +
1
2
σ2V (t)2F ′′[V (t)]
}
dt
+
√
1− ρ2σV (t)F ′[V (t)]dZ(t). (A.2)
Inspection of Eq. (A.2) reveals that the only risk associated with the dynamic portfolio
over dt is diversifiable and therefore the expected rate of return on the portfolio must be
equal to the riskless rate of interest, r. To avoid arbitrage opportunities, we have
{[
α− µmρσ
σm
]
V (t)F ′[V (t)] +
1
2
σ2V (t)2F ′′[V (t)]
}
dt
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= r
{
F [V (t)]− ρσ
σm
V (t)F ′[V (t)]
}
dt. (A.3)
Eliminating dt on both sides of Eq. (A.3) and rearranging terms yields Eq. (5).
Appendix B. Proof of Proposition 1
Using Eq. (10), we have
σ2
(
β − 1
2
)
+ α− λρσ = σ
√(
σ
2
− α− λρσ
σ
)2
+ 2r > 0. (A.4)
Eqs. (14) and (A.4) imply that ∂V ∗/∂σ has the same sign as that of σ(β − 1)− λρ, which
is negative if ρ ≤ 0 and ambiguous if ρ > 0.
For the case that ρ > 0, we write Eq. (10) as
σ(β − 1)− λρ =
√(
σ
2
− α − λρσ
σ
)2
+ 2r− 2α+ σ
2
2σ
. (A.5)
Note that
[√(
σ
2
− α− λρσ
σ
)2
+ 2r − 2α+ σ
2
2σ
][√(
σ
2
− α− λρσ
σ
)2
+ 2r +
2α+ σ2
2σ
]
=
(
σ
2
− α − λρσ
σ
)2
+ 2r−
(
2α+ σ2
2σ
)2
=
1
σ
[λρσ2+ (2r− 2α + λ2ρ2)σ − 2αλρ]. (A.6)
Inspection of Eqs. (A.5) and (A.6) reveals that σ(β − 1)− λρ has the same sign as that of
λρσ2+ (2r− 2α+ λ2ρ2)σ − 2αλρ, which is negative or positive depending on whether σ is
lower or higher than σ∗, respectively, where σ∗ is defined in Eq. (15). Note that
(
2r − 2α+ λ2ρ2
2λρ
)2
+ 2α <
(
2r − 2α+ λ2ρ2
2λρ
+
√
2α
)2
. (A.7)
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It then follows from Eq. (15) and inequality (A.7) that σ∗ <
√
2α.
Appendix C. Proof of Proposition 2
If ρ ≤ 0, we know from Proposition 1 that ∂V ∗/∂σ > 0 for all σ ∈ (0,√2α). Thus,
it follows from Eq. (23) that ∂E(T )/∂σ > 0 for all σ ∈ (0,√2α). On the other hand, if
ρ > 0, Proposition 1 implies that ∂V ∗/∂σ < 0 for all σ ∈ (0, σ∗) and ∂V ∗/∂σ > 0 for all
σ ∈ (σ∗,√2α). It then follows from Eq. (23) that ∂E(T )/∂σ > 0 for all σ ∈ [σ∗,√2α) but
has an ambiguous sign for all σ ∈ (0, σ∗).
For the case that ρ > 0, define the expression inside the squared brackets on the right-
hand side of Eq. (23) as M :
M = σln
(
V ∗
V0
)
+
(
α − σ
2
2
)
1
V ∗
∂V ∗
∂σ
. (A.8)
Differentiating Eq. (A.8) with respect to σ yields
∂M
∂σ
= ln
(
V ∗
V0
)
+
(
α − σ
2
2
)[
1
V ∗
∂2V ∗
∂σ2
−
(
1
V ∗
∂V ∗
∂σ
)2]
. (A.9)
Differentiating Eq. (14) with respect to σ yields
∂2V ∗
∂σ2
=
2I
(β − 1)3
(
∂β
∂σ
)2
− I
(β − 1)2
∂2β
∂σ2
. (A.10)
Substituting Eqs. (11), (14), and (A.10) into Eq. (A.9) yields
∂M
∂σ
= ln
(
V ∗
V0
)
+
α− σ2/2
β2(β − 1)2
[
(2β − 1)
(
∂β
∂σ
)2
− β(β − 1)∂
2β
∂σ2
]
. (A.11)
Differentiating Eq. (13) with respect to σ yields
∂2β
∂σ2
=
2β[λρ− σ(β − 1)][λρ− σ(2β − 1)]
[σ2(β − 1/2) + α− λρσ]2
− β(β − 1)
σ2(β − 1/2) + α− λρσ −
β2σ2[λρ− σ(β − 1)]2
[σ2(β − 1/2) + α − λρσ]3 . (A.12)
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Substituting Eqs. (13) and (A.12) into Eq. (A.11) yields
∂M
∂σ
= ln
(
V ∗
V0
)
+
α− σ2/2
(β − 1)2
{
[λρ− σ(β − 1)]2
[σ2(β − 1/2) + α− λρσ]2 +
2β(β − 1)σ[λρ− σ(β − 1)]
[σ2(β − 1/2) + α− λρσ]2
+
(β − 1)2
σ2(β − 1/2) + α− λρσ +
β(β − 1)σ2[λρ− σ(β − 1)]2
[σ2(β − 1/2) + α− λρσ]3
}
, (A.13)
which is unambiguously positive since σ(β − 1)− λρ < 0 for all σ ∈ (0, σ∗). It then follows
from Eq. (23) that ∂E(T )/∂σ is strictly increasing in σ for all σ ∈ (0, σ∗).
Substituting Eqs. (13) and (A.4) into Eq. (23) yields
∂E(T )
∂σ
=
σln(V ∗/V0)
(α− σ2/2)2 +
σ(β − 1)− λρ
(α− σ2/2)(β − 1)√(σ2/2− α + λρσ)2+ 2rσ2 . (A.14)
It is evident from Eq. (9) that β → r/α as σ → 0. Thus, taking limit on both sides of Eq.
(A.14) as σ → 0 yields
lim
σ→0
∂E(T )
∂σ
= − λρ
α(r − α) < 0. (A.15)
Since ∂E(T )/∂σ is strictly increasing in σ for all σ ∈ (0, σ∗) and ∂E(T )/∂σ > 0 for all
σ ∈ [σ∗,√2α), we conclude from Eq. (A.15) that there exists a unique point, σo ∈ (0, σ∗),
implicitly defined in Eq. (24), such that ∂E(T )/∂σ < 0 for all σ ∈ (0, σo) and ∂E(T )/∂σ > 0
for all σ ∈ (σo,√2α).
Appendix D. Proof of Proposition 3
Totally differentiating Eq. (24) with respect to α yields
dσo
dα
= −∂M
∂α
∣∣∣∣
σ=σo
/
∂M
∂σ
∣∣∣∣
σ=σo
. (A.16)
From Eq. (A.13), we know that ∂M/∂σ > 0 for all σ ∈ (0, σ∗) and in particular that
∂M/∂σ > 0 at σ = σo. Eq. (A.16) then implies that the sign of dσo/dα is opposite to
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that of ∂M/∂α evaluated at σ = σo. To prove this proposition, it suffices to show that
∂M/∂α < 0 at σ = σo if condition (26) holds.
Differentiating Eq. (A.8) with respect to α yields
∂M
∂α
=
1
V ∗
[
σ
∂V ∗
∂α
+
∂V ∗
∂σ
+
(
α − σ
2
2
)(
∂2V ∗
∂σ∂α
− 1
V ∗
∂V ∗
∂σ
∂V ∗
∂α
)]
. (A.17)
Differentiating Eq. (9) with respect to α yields
∂β
∂α
= − β
σ2(β − 1/2) + α− λρσ . (A.18)
Differentiating Eq. (13) with respect to α yields
∂2β
∂σ∂α
=
β[σ(3β − 2)− 2λρ]
[σ2(β − 1/2) + α− λρσ]2 +
β2σ2[λρ− σ(β − 1)]
[σ2(β − 1/2) + α− λρσ]3 , (A.19)
where we have used Eq. (A.18). Differentiating Eq. (11) with respect to α yields
∂V ∗
∂α
= − I
(β − 1)2
∂β
∂α
=
V ∗
(β − 1)[σ2(β − 1/2) + α− λρσ], (A.20)
where the second equality follows from Eqs. (11) and (A.18). Differentiating Eq. (14) with
respect to α yields
∂2V ∗
∂σ∂α
=
2I
(β − 1)3
∂β
∂σ
∂β
∂α
− I
(β − 1)2
∂2β
∂σ∂α
=
V ∗βσ2[σ(β − 1)− λρ]
(β − 1)[σ2(β − 1/2) + α− λρσ]3
− V
∗[σ(β − 1)(β − 2) + 2λρ]
(β − 1)2[σ2(β − 1/2) + α− λρσ]2 , (A.21)
where the second equality follows from Eqs. (11), (13), (A.18), and (A.19).
Using Eq. (10), we have
σβ − λρ =
√(
σ
2
− α− λρσ
σ
)2
+ 2r − 2α− σ
2
2σ
. (A.22)
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Note that
[√(
σ
2
− α− λρσ
σ
)2
+ 2r − 2α− σ
2
2σ
][√(
σ
2
− α− λρσ
σ
)2
+ 2r +
2α− σ2
2σ
]
=
(
σ
2
− α − λρσ
σ
)2
+ 2r−
(
2α− σ2
2σ
)2
=
1
σ
[λρσ2+ (2r+ λ2ρ2)σ − 2αλρ]. (A.23)
Inspection of Eqs. (A.22) and (A.23), we have σβ− λρ < (>) 0 if, and only if, σ < (>) σ,
where σ is given by
σ =
√(
2r+ λ2ρ2
2λρ
)2
+ 2α− 2r + λ
2ρ2
2λρ
. (A.24)
Since σ∗β − λρ = σ∗ > 0, we have σ∗ > σ. Evaluating Eq. (23) at σ = σ yields
∂E(T )
∂σ
∣∣∣∣
σ=σ
=
σ
(α− σ2/2)2
[
ln
(
β
β − 1
)
+ ln
(
I
V0
)
− 1
β − 1
]
, (A.25)
where we have used Eqs. (11) and (14) and the fact that σβ − λρ = 0. Note that
∂
∂β
[
ln
(
β
β − 1
)
+ ln
(
I
V0
)
− 1
β − 1
]
=
1
β(β − 1)2 > 0. (A.26)
From Eq. (13), we have ∂β/∂σ > 0 for all σ ∈ (0, σ∗). As σ → 0, Eq. (9) implies that
β → r/α. Thus, at σ = σ, we have β > r/α. Condition (26) and Eqs. (A.25) and (A.26)
then imply that
∂E(T )
∂σ
∣∣∣∣
σ=σ
> 0. (A.27)
Since ∂E(T )/∂σ is strictly increasing in σ for all σ ∈ (0, σ∗), it follows from Eq. (24) and
inequality (A.27) that σo < σ. Thus, we have σoβ − λρ < 0.
Substituting Eqs. (14), (A.20), and (A.21) into Eq. (A.17) yields
∂M
∂α
=
σβ − λρ
(β − 1)[σ2(β − 1/2) + α − λρσ]
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+
(
α− σ
2
2
){
βσ2[σ(β − 1)− λρ]
(β − 1)[σ2(β − 1/2) + α− λρσ]3
− σ(β − 1)
2 + λρ
(β − 1)2[σ2(β − 1/2) + α− λρσ]2
}
. (A.28)
Since σo < σ < σ∗, we have σo(β− 1)−λρ < σoβ−λρ < 0. Thus, Eq. (A.28) implies that
∂M/∂α < 0 at σ = σo so that dσo/dα > 0.
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